Abstract-Designing efficient channel access schemes for wireless communications without any prior knowledge about the nature of environments has been a very challenging issue, especially when the channel states distribution of all spectrum resources could be entirely or partially stochastic and/or adversarial at different time and locations. In this paper, we propose an adaptive channel access algorithm for wireless communications in unknown environments based on the theory of multi-armed bandits (MAB) problems. By automatically tuning two control parameters, i.e., learning rate and exploration probability, our algorithms are capable of finding the optimal channel access strategies and achieving the almost optimal learning performance over time under our defined four typical regimes for general unknown environments, e.g., the stochastic regime where channels follow some unknown i.i.d. process, the adversarial regime where all channels are suffered by adversarial jamming attack, the mixed stochastic and adversarial regime where a subset of channels are attacked and the contaminated stochastic regime where occasionally adversarial events contaminate the stochastic channel process, etc. To reduce the implementation time and space complexity, we further develop an enhanced algorithm by exploiting the internal structure of the selection of channel access strategy. We conduct extensive simulations in all these regimes to validate our theoretical analysis. The quantitative performance studies indicate the superior throughput gain and the flexibility of our algorithm in practice, which is resilient to both oblivious and adaptive jamming attacks with different intelligence and any attacking strength that ranges from no-attack to the full-attack of all spectrum resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wide deployments of smart wireless devices with adaptive and learning abilities for modern wireless communications and their facilitated wireless networks, such as cognitive radio networks, vehicular networks, commercial cellular networks and military wireless networks in highly dynamic, complex, potential denial of service attack (e.g., jamming attack) and battle-field, etc. environments have posed great challenge to the design of channel access strategies. Classically, the channel models assumed and used in the PHY and MAC layers in the wireless research community includes: Raleigh & Ricing fading model (e.g., cellular, sensor and mesh networks), Markov chain model (e.g., IEEE 802.11 [1] , network optimizations [2] ), and partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) model (known as the primary user channel model in cognitive radio networks [3] ), unknown model based on adaptive modulation and coding (utilize the ARQ as feedback information [4] ), to name a few, which are theoretically simple and sound but might not be accurate and very useful in many practical network deployments.
To resolve the optimal channel access problem in the above mentioned general wireless communication environments, where instant channel states can hardly be acquired before transmission and long term channel evolution process are unknown, online learning-based approaches are necessarily to be adopted. Especially, this problem fits into the Multiarmed bandit (MAB) problem nicely, and we have seen many recent works used the theory of MAB to resolve their channel access problems and achieve (near) optimal learning performance in many different network scenarios, such as [10] - [19] . Briefly speaking, these works can be categorized into two different type of MAB models, namely, stochastic MAB and adversarial (non-stochastic) MAB (See a recent survey in [5] ). Stochastic MAB assumes that channel states follow some unknown i.i.d. process, while adversarial MAB assumes that channel states can be affected and controlled arbitrarily by some adversaries, such as jamming attackers in wireless communication networks.
Among all these existing protocols, one key assumption made by most of them is that the nature of environments is either stochastic or adversarial, which is a known prior. However, such assumptions may not hold in practice due to at least the following three reasons. At first, the nature of environments are nevertheless to be known in advance and be only restricted to either the stochastic or the adversarial type. Consider the deployment of a wireless communication network in a potentially hostile environment. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications, mostly likely, certain portions of spatially-dispersed channel resources could be stochastic distributed, while others could be suffered by potential denial of service attackers (e.g., jammers, malicious cognitive radio user activity in cognitive radio networks, etc.) that is adversarial. Thus, we can not make a simple alternate judgement in advance. Second, in the above scenario, on one hand the use of stochastic MAB might not be applicable. On the other hand, the use of adversarial MAB model will lead to bad learning performance due to the fact that a large portion of channels might still be stochastically distributed. Third, even though we can make sure that there is no long term adversarial behaviors within the region of wireless communications, the often seen occasionally disturbing events in almost all the practical wireless communications, such as, the burst movements of individuals, the insensible gradation of whether conditions, and the seldom but irregular change of obstacles would make the stochastic channel distributions to be contaminated, and thus, it does not follow an i.i.d. process anymore. Therefore, it is unknown whether the stochastic MAB theory can still be applied here. Moreover, how to design a unified channel access scheme without any prior knowledge about the environments, providing quantitative performance guarantees and achieving the optimal throughput performance in all these different situations adaptively is a very challenging, which is highly desirable and bears great theoretical values.
In this paper, we propose a novel multi-channel access algorithm for wireless communications in unknown environments that achieves near-optimal performance in both stochastic and adversarial regimes without any prior knowledge about the nature of the environment, which provides a first theoretical foundation for scheme design and performance characterization for this challenging issue. Our framework is based on the famous EXP3 algorithm in the non-stochastic MAB [6] by introducing a new control lever of exploration parameters that are tailored for each channel. This algorithm works by simultaneously applying the "old" control lever, i.e., the learning rate, to control the regret in the adversarial regimes and the new control lever to detect and exploit the expected ∆ (between expected suboptimal channel gains and the optimal channel gains) between arm (or "channel") losses in the stochastic regimes and deterministic gaps between the arm losses in the adversarial regime. The algorithm does not need to distinguish the stochastic and adversarial MAB problem. Without making any hard statement about the nature of environments, our algorithm just runs in an adaptive way without knowledge of time horizon. When the environment happens to be adversarial under jamming attack, the wireless communication problem in this scenario becomes an anti-jamming problem without preshared secrets. Our proposed algorithm bears all advantages of the most recent and sophisticated uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) schemes in [10] [11] . We analytically show that the performance difference between our algorithm and the optimal one, called regret in this paper, is an order of "roott", which is optimal performance in the adversarial regime. When the environment happens to be stochastic, we show a problem-dependent "polylogarithmic" regret, which is slightly worse than the optimal "logarithmic" regret performance result shown in [7] . Note that all the regret bounds are still sublinear of timeslot t, which means that the optimal channel access strategy can be found. Nonetheless, the algorithm retains "polylogarithmic" regret guarantees in the stochastic regime even when some stochastic observations are contaminated by an adversary, as long as on average the contamination over all channels does not reduce the gap ∆ by more than a half. Our main contribution can be summarized as follows.
• 1) We provide a first adaptive frequency-hopping based multi-channel wireless communications protocol in unknown environments without the need to know about the nature of the environments. This is the first work in the wireless communication and networking society to bridge the stochastic and adversarial MABs into a unified framework with promising applications in practical wireless networks.
• 2) We analyze the features of the general wireless communication environment and divided it mainly into four regimes: the adversarial regime, the stochastic regime, the mixed adversarial and stochastic regime and the contaminated stochastic regime. We provide solid theoretical performance analysis for them, each of which achieves almost optimal regret performance. We believe that our proposed concepts of these regimes are not restricted only to wireless communications, it can be used in other engineering disciplines, e.g., the virus contaminations of internet information dissemination in social and computer networks, and the events of long term roadwork and occasionally appearance of obstacles in traffic planning in civil engineering, etc.
• 3) Our proposed AUFH-EXP3++ algorithm considers the statistical information sharing of a channel that belongs to different transmission strategies, which can be regarded as a special type of combinatorial semi-bandit 1 problem. In this scenario, given the size of all channels n and the number of receiving channels k r , AUFH-EXP3++ achieves the regret of order O(k r √ tn ln n) in the adversarial regime (for usually considered oblivious adversary) and the regret of orderÕ(
) in other stochastic regime up to time t. From the perspective of parameters n and k r for different configurations of wireless communications, AUFH-EXP3++ achieves tight regret bound in both the adversarial setting [31] and the stochastic setting [28] . We also study the performance of our algorithm under adaptive adversary for the first time.
• 4) We provide a computational efficient enhanced version of the AUFH-EXP3++ algorithm. Our algorithm enjoys linear time and space complexity in terms of n and k r that indicates very good scalability, which can be implemented in large scale wireless communication networks.
• 5) We conduct plenty of diversified numerical experiments, and simulation results demonstrate that all advantages of the AUFH-EXP3++ algorithm in our theoretical analysis is real and can be applied in practice. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the communication model, problem formulation, and the four regimes. Section III introduces the optimal adaptive uncoordinated frequency hopping algorithm, AUFH-EXP3++. The performance results for different regimes are presented in Section IV, while their theoretical proofs are shown in Section V. Section VI presents a computational efficient implementation of the AUFH-EXP3++ algorithm. Numerical and simulation results are available in Section VII. Related works are discussed in Section VIII. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. COMMUNICATION MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
We consider two wireless devices are making communications in an unknown environment, and each is within the other device's transmission range. The sender will constantly transmit data packets to the receiver with a synchronized time of reference over time. The feature of the wireless communication environment is assumed to be very flexible, where the channel model can follow some unknown i.i.d. stochastic process and can also be suffered by potentially and occasionally shown adversarial events with arbitrarily changing behavior (non-i.i.d.). Without loss of generality (W.l.o.g.), we focus our attention on the jamming attack as a representative adversarial model. We will categorize the feature of wireless communication environments into four typical regimes in the next for details. The transceiver pair adopts multi-channel wireless communications over a set of n available orthogonal channels to send and receive signals in parallel. Since the channel quality among these n channels might be different, the data rate varies across them. In the following discussion, we do not differentiate channels and frequencies. We denote the transmitter and receiver can transmit and receive on k t and k r (k t , k r ≤ n) channels, respectively. To provide practical and robust channel accessing protocols in unknown environments, we assume the transmitter and receiver do not pre-share any secrets with each other before data communication, and there is no feedback channel from the receiver to the transmitter if the receiver do not experience very low receiving data rates. To imitate the adversarial channel model, we assume there is one jammer that launches attack to the transceiver pair over n channels, and the jammer does not have the knowledge about the transceiver's strategies before data communication. We assume that the data rate from the transmitter on channel
Here constant M is the maximum data rate for all channels.
In the receiver side, we assume that after receiving data packets, there are efficient message verifications and authentications as in [8] [11] . Regarding the privacy issue, we can use our proposed protocols to transmit messages of a key establishment protocol to generate a secret key.
B. Adaptive Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping: Problem Setting
Since there is no shared secret between the transceiver pair, the multi-channel wireless communications in unknown environments needs to use frequency hopping strategies to dynamically select a subset of channels to maximize its accumulated data rates over time. Thus, we consider a frequency hopping game between a transmitter and receiver, and our protocol design use the idea of the Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping technique, a concept that can be found in [10] . However, we name ours as the Adaptive Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping (AUFH) protocol due to its flexibility to achieve optimal performance in various scenarios of the wireless environment. During each timeslot, the transmitter chooses k t channels for data transmission and the receiver chooses k r channels to receive data. Every timeslot, the transmitter selects k t channels out of n to send its data packets, while the receiver will hear and offload data packets on k r channels out of n. The channel rewards are only affected by the distribution of the channel conditions. Within the wireless environment, if no adversarial event happens, the distributions of all channels are stochastic. Otherwise, there might exist many different kinds of adversarial events, such as a constantly shown jammer with different degree of intelligence (see the attack model part in next subsection), occasionally shown disturbing events (we still view them to be launched by a jammer, but we call it a "occasionally shown jammer"), jammer that attacks all or a portion of channels in the environment, etc. However, the transmitter and receiver do not know any information about all these events. Here, in the view of the receiver side, its selection of the frequency hopping strategy to maximize the cumulated data packets reception has the following challenge: 1) the receiver does not know the transmitter and adversarial events in the environment, thus it has no good channel access strategy to begin with; 2) the receiver is desirable to have an adaptively optimal channel access strategy regardless of any different type of jamming events or even with no jamming event. Therefore, to obtain the optimal solution of channel accessing strategy, we consider the above AUFH problem as a sequential decision problem, in which the choice of receiving channels at each timeslot is a decision. Formally, we consider a vector space {0, 1}
n of all n available channels. The strategy space for the transmitter is denoted as S t ⊆ {0, 1} n of size n kt , and the receiver's is denoted as S r ⊆ {0, 1} n of size n kr . If the f -channel is selected for transmitting and receiving data, the value of the f -th entry of a vector (channel access strategy) is 1, and 0 otherwise. In the case of the existence of jamming attack on a subset of k j channels, the strategy space for the jammer is denoted as S j ⊆ {0, 1} n of size n kj . For convenience, we say that the f -th channel is jammed if the value of f -th entry is 0 and the f -th channel is unjammed if the value of f -th entry is 1.
During each timeslot, the transmitter and receiver select their own respective strategies k t and k r . On the transmitter side, the maximal number of data packets it can transmit is of the size M at each timeslot. At each timeslot, if the k r channels are stochastically evolving with constant transmission power, the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at timeslot t, SNR t , is also stochastically distributed. In this case, the receiving date rate g t (f ) for channel f is also stochastically distributed where its value equals to a mapping function r(·) of SNR t (f ), i.e., r(SNR t (f )). When jamming happens at timeslot t for channel f , its channel quality SNR t (f ) is completely taken over and controlled by the jammer such that the data rate g t (f ) = r(SNR t (f )) can be varied in an arbitrary way. After choosing a strategy s r , the value of the data rate (or called "reward") g t (f ) is revealed to the receiver if and only if f is chosen as a receiving channel.
Formally, the frequency hopping multi-channel access problem can be formulated as a MAB that is described as follows: at each timeslot t = 1, ..., T , the receiver as a decision maker select a strategy I t from S r . The cardinality of S r is |S r | = N . The reward g t (f ) is assigned to each channel f ∈ {1, ..., n} and the receiver only get rewards in strategy i ∈ S r . Note that I t denotes a particular strategy chosen at timeslot t from the receiver's strategy set S r , and i denotes a strategy in S r . The total reward of a strategy i in timeslot t is g t (i) = f ∈i g t (f ). Then, the cumulative reward up to time slot t of each strategy is
On the other hand, the total reward over all the chosen strategies by the receiver up to timeslot t is:
where the strategy I s is chosen randomly according to some distribution over S r . The performance of this algorithm is qualified by regret R(t), defined as the difference between the expected number of successfully received data packets using our proposed algorithm up to t timeslots and the expected rewards that using the best fixed solution up to t timeslots for the game, i.e.,
where the maximum is taken over all available strategies to the receiver. However, in our next discussion of the AUFHbased algorithm design, if we use the gain (reward) model, we have to apply additional smoothing of the playing distribution p t (e) regardingg t (f ). Thus, we can introduce the loss model by the simple trick of ℓ t (f ) = 1 − g t (f ) for each channel f and ℓ t (i) = k r − g t (i) for each strategy, respectively. Then, we have
f ∈i ℓ s (f ), and similarly, we haveĜ t = tk r −L t . In this case the analysis is based on the inequality e −x ≤ 1 − x + 1/2x 2 , which holds for all positive x. Therefore, there is no need to control the range of ℓ t (f ). We decompose expectations of incremental sums into incremental sums of conditional expectations and use E t [·] to denote expectations on realization of all strategies as random variables up to round t. Therefore, the expected regret can be rewritten as
The expectation is taken over the possible randomness of the proposed algorithm and loss generation model. The goal of the algorithm is to minimize the regret. The above definition of regret is usually named as the pseudo regret [5] , which is upper bounded by the expected regret E{R(t)} = E{ t s=1 ℓ t (I t ) − min i∈Sr t s=1 ℓ t (i)}. Only when the adversary is oblivious, who prepares the entire sequence of loss functions ℓ t (I t ) (t = 1, 2, 3, ...) in advance, pseudo regret (1) coincides with the standard expected regret E{R(t)} [5] .
Note that the choice of the loss function at timeslot t of the oblivious adversary is independent to the first t − 1 timeslots. Otherwise, the adversary can be called an adaptive adversary. In this case, let us denote the decision maker's entire sequence of strategies up to current timslot t as (I 1 , ..., I t ), which we abbreviate by I 1,...,t . The expected cumulative loss suffered by the player after t rounds is E[ t s=1 ℓ s (I 1,...,s )]. We need to compare it with a competitor class C t , which is simply a set of deterministic strategy sequences of length t. Intuitively, we would like to compare the decision maker's loss with the cumulative loss of the best action sequence in C t . In practice, the most common way to evaluate the decision maker's performance is to measure its external pseudo-regret compared to C t [6] . Thus, the regret for adaptive adversary is defined as,
This regret definition is suitable for most of the theoretical works of the online learning and bandit setting. If the adversary is oblivious, we have ℓ t (I 1,...,t ) equals to ℓ t (I t ). With this simplified notation, the regret in (2) becomes
which is exactly the same as (1) with C t = S r , if we take an expectation over all the strategy sequence (y 1 , ..., y t ).
C. Four Regimes of Wireless Communications Environments
As we have pointed out, our proposed algorithm does not need to know the nature of the environments, there exists different features of environments that will affect the performance of the algorithm. We have categorized them into four regimes as shown in Fig. 1 .
1) Adversarial Regime:
In this regime, there is a jammer sending interfering power or injecting garbage data packets over all n channels such that the transceiver's channel rewards are suffered and completely controlled by an unrestricted jammer (See Fig.1 (a) ). When we assume the use of the same level of transmission power as in the stochastic regime, the data rate will usually greatly be reduced in the adversarial regime. Note that the adversarial regime as a classic model of the well known non-stochastic MAB problem [6] implies that the jammer often launches attack in almost 2 every timeslot. It is the most general setting and the other three regimes can be regarded as special cases of the adversarial regime. A strategy
} is known as a best strategy in hindsight for the first t round.
Attack Model: As different attack philosophies will lead to different level of effectiveness. We focus on the following two type of jammers in the adversarial regime
• a) oblivious jammer: an oblivious jammer attacks different channels with different jamming strength as a result of different data rate reductions, which is independent of the past communication records he might have observed.
The behaviors of the oblivious jammer can be categorized into two models: static jamming and random jamming. The static jammer continuously emits the same level of interfering radios and keeps jamming the same set of channels for each timeslots. In the adversarial regime, we consider all the channels are suffering jamming attack with potentially different attacking strength. In our protocol, after a number of data communication timeslots, the receiver will detect the jamming behavior based on past observations and adjust its channel accessing strategies into lightly jammed and unjammed channels. Similarly, the random jamming, where its attacking strategy is independent of the previous communication records, is slightly hard to detect than static jamming. The random jammer will randomly distribute the different attacking strength of its jamming signals over a set of channels, which is not that straightforward for jamming detection.
• b) Adaptive jammer: an adaptive jammer adaptively select its jamming strength on the targeted set of jamming channels by utilizing its past experience and observation of the previous communication records. In the adversarial regime, we consider that the adaptive jammer is very powerful in the sense that it no only knows the communication protocol and can attack with different level of strength over a subset of channels for data communications during a single timeslot, but also can monitor all the n available channels during the same timeslot. Furthermore, the adaptive jammer can forecast its jamming strength and targeted jamming channels for future timeslots based on his past records of information of each channel. As shown in a recent work, no bandit algorithm can guarantee a sublinear regret o(t) against an adaptive adversary with unbounded memory. Because the adaptive adversary can mimic and perform the same learning algorithm as the decision maker, i.e., the receiver in our work, and set the same channel access probabilities as the channel access algorithm, which leads to a linear regret. Therefore, in practice, we consider an mmemory-bounded adaptive adversary [35] model. It is an adversary that is constrained to choose loss functions that depend only on the m + 1 most recent strategies.
2) Stochastic Regime:
In this regime, the transceiver is communicating over n stochastic channels as shown in Fig.1 (b). The channel losses ℓ t (f ), ∀f ∈ 1, ..., n (Obtained by transferring the reward to loss ℓ t (f ) = 1−g t (f )) of each channel f are sampled independently from an unknown distribution that depends on f , but not on t. We use µ f = E [ℓ t (f )] to denote the expected loss of channel f . We define channel f is called the best channel if µ(f ) = min f ′ {µ(f ′ )} and suboptimal channel otherwise; let f * denote some best channel. Similarly, for each strategy i ∈ S r , we have the best strategy µ(i) = min i ′ { f ∈i ′ µ(f )} and suboptimal strategy otherwise; let i * denote some best strategy. For each channel f , define the gap
Let N t (f ) and N t (i) be the respective number of times channel f and strategy i was played up to time t, the regret can be rewritten as
Note that we can calculate the regret either from the perspective of channels f ∈ 1, ..., n or from the perspective of strategies i ∈ S r . However, because of the set of strategies is of the size n kr that grows exponentially with respect to n and it does not exploit the channel dependency between different strategies, we can calculate the regret from channels, where tight regret bounds are achievable.
3) Mixed Adversarial and Stochastic Regime: In this regime, it assumes that the jammer only attack k j out n channels at each timeslot. As shown in Fig.1 (c) , it is obvious that, from the perspective of both transmitter and receiver, there is always a k j /n portion of channels that is suffered by jamming attack while the other (n − k j )/n portion is stochastically distributed. Thus, namely we call this regime as the mixed adversarial and stochastic regime.
Attack Model: We consider the same type of jammer as described in the adversarial regime for the mixed adversarial and stochastic regime, which includes: static jamming and random jamming of the oblivious jammer and the adaptive jammer. The difference here is that the jammer only attacks a subset of channels of size k j over the total n channels.
4) Contaminated Stochastic Regime:
The definition of the contaminated stochastic regime comes from many practical observations that only a small amount of timeslots and channels where adversarial events show up in the environments. Then arose an interesting question: is this environment still stochastic or adversarial? Fortunately, we at the first time answer this question. In this regime, for oblivious jammer, the attacker selects some slot-channel pairs (t, f ) as "locations" to attack before the multi-channel wireless communications start and the channel rewards vary in an arbitrary way. The remaining channel rewards are generated according to the stochastic regimes.
We call a contaminated stochastic regime moderately contaminated after τ timslots if for all t > τ the total number of contaminated locations of each suboptimal channel up to time t is at most t∆(f )/4 and the number of contaminated locations of each best channel is at most t∆/4. By this definition, we can prove that for all t > τ on the average over the stochasticity of the loss sequence the adversary can reduce the gap of every channel by at most one half. Thus, we can still keep the classic order of polylogarithmic regret in the stochastic regime by a factor of 2 regret bound increase.
III. THE OPTIMAL ADAPTIVE UNCOORDINATED FREQUENCY HOPPING ALGORITHM
In this section, we focus on developing an adaptive frequency hopping algorithm as an optimal channel access solution for the receiver. The design philosophy is that the receiver collects and learns the rewards of its previously chosen channels. Accordingly, it can dynamically adjust its channel access strategy for the next timeslot. If there is a jammer with different kinds of attacking power strength, attack scope (subsets of channels) and intelligence, such as oblivious jammer and adaptive jammers, etc, our designed algorithms will cope all these situations. Specifically, the expected regret defined in (1) has a natural interpretation when the adversary is oblivious [5] , while the obtained regret results still hold and are upper bounds for the adaptive jammer. The main difficulty in designing any channel hopping algorithm in unknown environments requires the algorithm to appropriately balance between exploitation and exploration. On one hand, such an algorithm needs to keep exploring the best set of channels to receiving the data packets due to the dynamic changing of the environments; on the other hand, the algorithm needs to exploit the already selected best set of channels so that they will not be under utilized.
A. An MAB-based Algorithm for AUFH
We describe a variant of the MAB algorithm for AUFH as shown in Algorithm 1, namely AUFH-EXP3++, is a variant Set:
.
The receiver selects a channel hopping strategy I t at random according to the strategy's probability p t (i), ∀f ∈ [1, n], with p t (i) computed as follows:
The computation is taken for the probability distributions over all strategies
The receiver computes the probability
Then, the probability distributions over all channels are
The receiver calculates the loss for channel f , ℓ t−1 (f ), ∀f ∈ I t based on the received channel gain g t−1 (f ) by using ℓ t−1 (f ) = 1 − g t−1 (f ). Compute the estimated lossl t (f ), ∀f ∈ [1, n] as follows:
The receiver updates all the weights as
The sum of the total weights of the strategies is
end for based on EXP3 algorithm, whose performance in the four regimes will be asymptotically optimal. Our new algorithm uses the fact that when rewards of channels of the chosen strategy are revealed, this also provides some information about the rewards of each strategy sharing common channels with the chosen strategy. As noticed, the conversion from rewards (gains) to losses is done in order to facilitate subsequent performance analysis. During each time slot, we assign a channel weight that is dynamically adjusted based on the channel losses revealed to the receiver. The weight of a strategy is determined by the product of weights of all channels. Our algorithm has two control levers: the learning rate η t and the exploration parameters ξ t (f ) for each channel f . To facilitate the adaptive channel access to optimal solutions without the knowledge about the nature of the environments, the crucial innovation is the introduction of exploration parameters ξ t (f ), which are tuned individually for each arm depending on the past observations. Let N denote the total number of strategies at the receiver side. A set of covering strategy is defined to ensure that each channel is sampled sufficiently often. It has the property that for each channel f , there is a strategy i ∈ C such that f ∈ i. Since there are only n channels and each strategy includes k r channels, we have |C| = ⌈ n kr ⌉. The value f ∈i ε t (f ) means the randomized exploration probability for each strategy i ∈ C, where f ∈i ε t (f ) is the summation of each channel f 's exploration probability that belongs to the strategy i. The introduction of f ∈i ε t (f ) ensures that p t (i) ≥ f ∈i ε t (f ) so that a mixture of exponentially weighted average distribution and uniform distribution [21] .
In the following discussion, we show that tuning only the learning rate η t is sufficient to control and obtain the regret of the AUFH-EXP3++ in the adversarial regime, regardless of the choice of exploration parameters ξ t (f ). Then we show that tuning only the exploration parameter ξ t (f ) is sufficient to control the regret of AUFH-EXP3++ in the stochastic regimes regardless of the choice of η t , as long as η t ≥ β t . To facilitate the AUFH-EXP3++ algorithm without knowing about the nature of environments, we can apply the two control levers simultaneously by setting η t = β t and use the control parameter ξ t (f ) in the stochastic regimes such that it can achieve the optimal "root-t" regret in the adversarial regime and almost optimal "logarithmic" regret in the stochastic regime (though with a suboptimal power in the logarithm). In addition, we show that the new control lever ξ t (f ) is even more powerful and allows to detect and exploit the gap in even more challenging situations of the contaminated stochastic regimes.
IV. PERFORMANCE RESULTS IN DIFFERENT REGIMES
We analyze the regret performance of our proposed AUFH-EXP3++ algorithm in different regimes in the following.
A. Adversarial Regimes
We first show that tuning η t is sufficient to control the regret of AUFH-EXP3++ in the adversarial regime, which is a general result that holds for all other regimes. Theorem 1. Under the oblivious jamming attack, no matter how the status of the channels change (potentially in an adversarial manner), for η t = β t and any ξ t (f ) ≥ 0, the regret of the AUFH-EXP3++ algorithm for any t satisfies: R(t) ≤ 4k r √ tn ln n. Theorem 2. Under the m-memory-bounded adaptive jamming attack, no matter how the status of the channels change (potentially in an adversarial manner), for η t = β t and any ξ t (f ) ≥ 0, the regret of the AUFH-EXP3++ algorithm for any t satisfies is upper bounded by:
).
B. Stochastic Regime
Now we show that for any η t ≥ β t , tuning the exploration parameters ξ t (f ) is sufficient to control the regret of the algorithm in the stochastic regime. We consider a different number of ways of tuning the exploration parameters ξ t (f ) for different practical implementation considerations, which will lead to different regret performance of AUFH-EXP3++. We begin with an idealistic assumption that the gaps ∆(f ), ∀f ∈ n is known, just to give an idea of what is the best result we can have and our general idea for all our proofs.
Theorem 3.
Assume that the gaps ∆(f ), ∀f ∈ n, are known. Let t * be the minimal integer that satisfy t
From the upper bound results, we note that the leading constant k r n is optimal and tight, which is confirmed by the general result for stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits of the CombUCB1 [28] algorithm. However, we have a factor of ln(t) worse of the regret performance than the optimal "logarithmic" regret as in [7] [28], which is an open question. We believe that this gap can finally be closed by more advanced techniques.
1) A Practical Implementation by estimating the gap:
Because of the gaps ∆(f ), ∀f ∈ n can not be known in advance before running the algorithm. In the next, we show a more practical result that using the empirical gap as an estimate of the true gap. The estimation process can be performed in background for each channel f that starts from the running of the algorithm, i.e.,
This is the first practical algorithm that can be used in many real-world applications. AVG , in the stochastic regime satisfies:
From the theorem, we know that in this more practical case, there a factor of ln(t) worse of the regret performance than in the idealistic case and the additive constants t * in this theorem is very large. However, in our experimental section, we show that a minor modification of this algorithm performs comparably to ComUCB1 [28] in the stochastic regime.
C. Mixed Adversarial and Stochastic Regime
The mixed adversarial and stochastic regime can be regarded as a special case of mixing adversarial and stochastic regimes. Since there is always a jammer randomly attacking k j channels constantly over time, we will have the following theorem for the AUFH-EXP3++ AVG algorithm, which is a much more refined regret performance bound than the general regret bound in the adversarial regime. 
, termed as AUFH-EXP3++
AVG under oblivious jamming attack, in the mixed stochastic and adversarial regime satisfies:
Note that the results in Theorem 4 has better regret performance than the results obtained by stochastic MAB as shown in Theorem 1 and the anti-jamming algorithm in [11] . 
AVG m-memory-bounded adaptive jamming attack, in the mixed stochastic and adversarial regime satisfies:
The results shown in Theorem 6 provides the first quantitative regret performance under adaptive jamming attack, while the related work [11] with the similar adversary model and the same communication scenario in this case only provided simulation results demonstrations.
D. Contaminated stochastic regime
We first show that the algorithm AUFH-EXP3++ AVG can still sustain "polylogarithmic" regret in the contaminated stochastic regime with a potentially large leading constant in the performance. Then, we define the moderately contaminated stochastic regime without a significant deterioration in performance. We also define the severely contaminated stochastic regime. The general result for the contaminated stochastic regime is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.
Under the setting of all parameters given in Theorem 3, for t * (f ) = max t * , e
4/∆(f )
2
, where t * is defined as before and t * 3 = max {f ∈n} t * (f ), and parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1/2) the regret of the AUFH-EXP3++ algorithm in the contaminated stochastic regime that is contaminated after τ steps satisfies:
. In this theorem, we can view the parameter ζ as the attacking strength parameter.
For the moderately contaminated stochastic regime, we set the attacking strength parameter ζ to be at most 1/4. The price that is paid for moderate contamination after τ steps is the scaling of ∆(f ) by a factor of most 1/2 (ζ = 1/4) and the introduction of a new factor of τ .
For the severely contaminated stochastic regime where ζ ∈ (1/4, 1/2), we can find that the leading factor 1/(1 − 2ζ) is very large, where the regret performance analysis from the stochastic regime will lead to large regret which could be much worse than the regret performance in the adversarial regime for both oblivious and adaptive adversary. Thus, it is not quite meaningful as a theoretical regret bound, and we can use the severely contaminated stochastic regime to emulate the adversary regime in our simulations.
V. PROOFS OF REGRETS IN DIFFERENT REGIMES
We prove the theorems of the performance results from the previous section in the order they were presented.
A. The Adversarial Regimes
The proof of Theorem 1 borrows some of the analysis of EXP3 of the loss model in [5] . However, the introduction of the new mixing exploration parameter and the truth of channel/frequency dependency as a special type of combinatorial MAB problem in the loss model makes the proof a non-trivial task, and we prove it for the first time.
Proof of Theorem 1. Proof: Note first that the following equalities can be easily verified:
pt(It) and E It∼pt 1 pt(It) = N . Then, we can immediately rewrite R(t) and have
The key step here it to consider the expectation of the cumulative lossesl t (i) in the sense of distribution i ∼ p t . Let ε t (i) = f ∈i ε t (f ). However, because of the mixing terms of p t , we need to introduce a few more notations. Let u = (
the distribution over all the strategies. Let ω t = pt−u 1− f εt(f ) be the distribution induced by AUFH-EXP3++ at the time t without mixing. Then we have:
Recall that for all the strategies, we have distribution ω t = (ω t (1), ..., ω t (N )) with
and for all the channels, we have distribution ω t,f = (ω t,f (1), ..., ω t,f (n))
In the second step, we use the inequalities lnx ≤ x − 1 and exp(−x) − 1 + x ≤ x 2 /2, for all x ≥ 0, to obtain:
where we used
in the last step. Moreover, take expectations over all random strategies of lossesl s (i) 2 , we have
where the last inequality follows the fact that
2 by the definition of ε t (f ).
In the third step, note thatL
The second term in (3) can be bounded by using the same technique in [5] (page [26] [27] [28] . Let us substitute inequality (7) into (6), and then substitute (6) into equation (3) and sum over t and take expectation over all random strategies of losses up to time t, we obtain
Then, we get
Note that, the inequality (a) holds by settingl s (i) = k r , ∀i, s, and the upper bound is k r i∈C f ∈i ε t (f ) = k r t s=1 n f =1 ε s (f ). The inequality (b) holds is because of, for every timeslot t, η t ≥ ε t (f ). The inequality (c) is due to the fact that N ≤ n kr . Setting η t = b t , we prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Proof: To defend against the m-memory-bounded adaptive adversary, we need to adopt the idea of the mini-batch protocol proposed in [35] . We define a new algorithm by wrapping AUFH-EXP3++ with a mini-batching loop [36] . We specify a batch size τ and name the new algorithm AUFH-EXP3++ τ . The idea is to group the overall timeslots 1, ..., t into consecutive and disjoint mini-batches of size τ . It can be viewed that one signal mini-batch as a round (timeslot) and use the average loss suffered during that mini-batch to feed the original AUFH-EXP3++. Note that our new algorithm does not need to know m, which only appears as a constant as shown in Theorem 2. So our new AUFH-EXP3++ τ algorithm still runs in an adaptive way without any prior about the environment. If we set the batch τ = (4k r √ n ln n)
in Theorem 2 of [35] , we can get the regret upper bound in our Theorem 2.
B. The Stochastic Regime
Our proofs are based on the following form of Bernstein's inequality with minor improvement as shown in [22] . Lemma 8. (Bernstein's inequality for martingales). Let X 1 , ..., X m be martingale difference sequence with respect to filtration F = (F i ) 1≤k≤m and let Y k = k j=1 X j be the associated martingale. Assume that there exist positive numbers ν and c, such that X j ≤ c for all j with probability 1 and
2 |F k−1 ≤ ν with probability 1.
We also need to use the following technical lemma, where the proof can be found in [22] .
Lemma 9. For any c > 0, we have
To obtain the tight regret performance for AUFH-EXP3++, we need to study and estimate the number of times each of channel is selected up to time t, i.e., N t (f ). We summarize it in the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let {ε t (f )} ∞ t=1 be non-increasing deterministic sequences, such that ε t (f ) ≤ ε t (f ) with probability 1 and ε t (f ) ≤ ε t (f * ) for all t and f . Define ν t (f ) = 1 krε t (f ) , and define the event E
Then for any positive sequence b 1 , b 2 , ..., and any t * ≥ 2 the number of times channel f is played by AUFH-EXP3++ up to round t is bounded as:
where
Proof: Note that the elements of the martingale difference
, we can simplify the upper bound by using
We further note that
with probability 1. The above inequality (a) is due to the fact that q t (f ) ≥ f ∈i ε t (f ) |{i ∈ C : f ∈ i}|. Since each f only belongs to one of the covering strategies i ∈ C, |{i ∈ C : f ∈ i}| equals to 1 at time slot t if channel f is selected. Thus, 
We further upper bound
The above inequality (a) is due to the fact that channel f only belongs to one selected strategy i in t − 1, inequality (b) is because of the cumulated regret of each strategy is great than the cumulated regret of each channel that belongs to the strategy, and the last inequality (c) we used the fact that
is a non-increasing sequence υ t (f ) ≤ t kr ε t (f ) . Substitution of this result back into the computation of E[N t (f )] completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. Proof: The proof is based on Lemma 10. Let b t = ln(t∆(f )
2 ) and ε t (f ) = ε t (f ). For any c ≥ 18 and any t ≥ t * , where t * is the minimal integer for which
, we have
is an increasing function with respect to k r (k r ≥ 1). Plus, as indicated in work [28] , by a bit more sophisticated bounding c can be made almost as small as 2 in our case. By substitution of the lower bound on h t (f ) into Lemma 10, we have
where we used lemma 3 to bound the sum of the exponents. In addition, please note that t * is of the order O(
Proof of Theorem 4. Proof:
The proof is based on the similar idea of Theorem 2 and Lemma 10. Note that by our definition∆ t (f ) ≤ 1 and the sequence ε t (f ) = ε t = min{ , we have ε t = c ln (t) 2 t . Let b t = ln(t) and let t * be large enough, so that for all t ≥ t * we have t ≥ 4c 2 ln (t) 4 n ln(n) and t ≥ e 1 ∆(f ) 2 . With these parameters and conditions on hand, we are going to bound the rest of the three terms in the bound on E[N t (f )] in Lemma 10. The upper bound of
where the inequality (a) is due to the fact that
) is an increasing function with respect to k r (k r ≥ 1) and the inequality (b) due to the fact that for t ≥ t * we have ln(t) ≥ 1/∆(f ). Thus,
. Finally, for the last term in Lemma 10, we have already get h t (f ) ≥ 1 2 ∆(f ) for t ≥ t * as an intermediate step in the calculation of bound on∆ t (f ). Therefore, the last term is bounded in a order of O(
Define the event Z f t :
where ε t is defined in the proof of Theorem 3 and ν t = For the regret performance in the moderately contaminated stochastic regime, according to our definition with the attacking strength ζ ∈ [0, 1/4], we only need to replace ∆(f ) by ∆(f )/2 in Theorem 5.
VI. THE COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE AUFH-EXP3++ ALGORITHM The implementation of algorithm 1 requires the computation of probability distributions and storage of N strategies, which is obvious to have a time and space complexity O(n kr ). As the number of channels increases, the strategy will become exponentially large, which is very hard to be scalable and results in low efficiency. To address this important problem, we propose a computational efficient enhanced algorithm by utilizing the dynamic programming techniques, as shown in Algorithm 2. The key idea of the enhanced algorithm is to select the receiving channels one by one until k r channels are chosen, instead of choosing a strategy from the large strategy space in each timeslot.
We use S f ,k to denote the strategy set of which each strategy selectsk channels fromf ,f + 1,f , ..., n. We also useS f ,k to denote the strategy set of which each strategy selectsk channels from channel 1, 2, ...,f. We define
f ∈i w t (f ), Note that they have the following properties:
by using dynamic programming for all 1 ≤f ≤ n and 1 ≤k ≤ k r .
In step 1, a strategy should be drawn from n kr strategies. Instead of drawing a strategy, we select channel for the strategy one by one until a strategy is found. Here, we select channels one by one in the increasing order of channel indices, i.e., we determine whether the channel 1 should be selected, and the channel 2, and so on. For any channel f , if k ≤ k r channels have been chosen in channel 1, .., f − 1, we select channel f with probability
and not select f with probability
Wt−1(f,kr −k) . Let w(f ) = w t−1 (f ) if channel f is selected in the strategy i; w(f ) = 0 otherwise. Obviously, w(f ) is actually the weight of f in the strategy weight. In our algorithm,
denotes the number of channels chosen among channel 1, 2, ...,f in strategy i. In this implementation, the probability that a strategy i is selected is
This probability is equivalent to that in Algorithm 1, which implies the implementation is correct. Because we do not maintain w t (i), it is impossible to compute q t (f ) as we have described in Algorithm 1. Then q t (f ) can be computed within O(nk r ) as in Eq.(4) for each round.
Moreover, for the exploration parameters ε t (f ), since there are k r parameters of ε t (f ) in the last term of Eqs. (6) and there are n channels, the storage complexity is O(k r n). Similarly, we have the time complexity O(k r nt) for the maintenance of exploration parameters ε t (f ). Based on the above analysis, we can summarize the conclusions into the following theorem.
Theorem 11. The Algorithm 2 has time complexity O(k r nt) and space complexity O(k r n), which has the linear scalability along with rounds t, and parameters k r and n.
Algorithm 2 An Computational Efficient Implementation of AUFH-EXP3++
Input: n, k r , t, and See text for definition of η t and ξ t (f ). Initialization: Set initial channel weight w 0 (f ) = 1, ∀f ∈ [1, n]. Let W t (f, 0) = 1 and W (n + 1, k) =W (0, k) = 0 and compute W 0 (f, k) andW 0 (f, k) follows Eqs. (8) and (9), respectively. for timeslot t = 1, 2, ... do 1: The receiver selects a channel f, ∀f ∈ [1, n] one by one according to the channel's probability distribution computed following Eq. (10) until a strategy with k r chosen channels are selected. 2: The receiver computes the probability q t (f ), ∀f ∈ [1, n] according to Eq. (6). 3: The receiver calculates the loss for channel f , ℓ t−1 (f ), ∀f ∈ I t based on the received channel gain g t−1 (f ) by using ℓ t−1 (f ) = 1 − g t−1 (f ). Compute the estimated lossl t (f ), ∀f ∈ [1, n] as follows:
The receiver updates all channel weights as
, and computes W t (f, k) andW t (f, k) follows Eqs. (8) and (9), respectively. end for Besides, because of the channel selection probability for q t (f ) and the updated weights of Algorithm 2 equals to Algorithm 1, all the performance results in Section IV still hold for Algorithm 2.
VII. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we consider the wireless communications from a transmitter to a receiver that is by default in the stochastic regime with Bernoulli distributions for rewards. W.l.o.g., we consider a constant unitary data packet rate from the transmitter for each channel k t ⊆ S t over every timeslot t, i.e. M = 1 packet, where k t = 4. All experiments were conducted on an off-the-shelf desktop with dual 6-core Intel i7 CPUs clocked at 2.66Ghz. For all the suboptimal channels the rewards are Bernoulli with bias 0.5, and we set a single best channel that the reward is Bernoulli with bias 0.5 + ∆. At first, we run our experiments by choosing different set of available channels n = 8, 16, 50. The set of receiving channels at the receiver is always k r = 4. We set ∆ = 0.1 and ∆ = 0.01 as two typical channel settings. Thus, in total we have six combinations in terms of K and ∆. To show the advantage of our AUFH-EXP3++ algorithms, we need to compare the performance of ours to other existing MAB based algorithms. That includes: the anti-jamming EXP3 based algorithm in [11] , and we named it as "Anti-Jam-EXP3"; The combinatorial UCB-based algorithm "CombUCB1" with almost tight regret bound as proved in [28] ; the combinatorial version of the Thompson's sampling algorithm [32] . Here we use the Thompson's sampling algorithm for comparison is based on the empirical demonstration in [29] that its performance is comparable or superior to the latest most advanced algorithms, such as "EwS" and "KL-UCB" (See [5] ), and the later two algorithms (in our combinatorial multi-channel selection setting and implementation) are excluded from the comparison. We make ten repetitions of each experiment to reduce the performance bias. In Fig. 2-5 , the solid lines in the graphs represents the mean performance over the experiments and the dashed lines represents the mean plus on standard deviation (std) over the ten repetitions of the corresponding experiments. Because of the fixed optimal channel access strategy max i∈Sr E {G t (i)}, given a regret performance valuē R(t), the accumulated successfully received data packets received up to t for a channel access strategy A, i.e.,Ĝ t , is at least max i∈Sr E {G t (i)} −R(t). That means the small regret values indicate the large number of data packet reception.
In our first experiments shown in Fig. 2 , we run each of the algorithm for 10 7 rounds. For different versions of our AUFH-EXP3++ algorithms, they are parameterized by
2 , where∆ t (f ) is the empirical estimate of ∆ t (f ) defined in (IV-B1). The target of our experiment is to demonstrate that in the stochastic regime the exploration parameters are in full control of the performance we run the AUFH-EXP3++ algorithm with two different learning rates.
AUFH-EXP3++
EMP corresponds to η t = β t and AUFH-EXP3++ ACC corresponds to η t = 1. Note that only AUFH-EXP3++
EMP has a performance guarantee in the adversarial regime. For our AUFH-EXP3++ algorithms, we transform the rewards into losses via ℓ t (f ) = 1−g t (f ) transformation, other algorithms operate directly on the rewards.
From the results presented in Fig. 2 , we see that in all the experiments, the performance of AUFH-EXP3++
EMP is almost identical to the performance of CombUCB1. That means our algorithm can attain almost optimal transmission efficiency in stochastic environments. AUFH-EXP3++ EMP has all advantages of the stochastic MAB algorithms, and it has much better performance gain than Anti-Jam-EXP3 [11] when the discrimination of the best and the second best channel is relatively large. Moreover, unlike CombUCB1 and Thompson's sampling, AUFH-EXP3++
EMP is secured against a potential adversary during the wireless communications game. In addition, the AUFH-EXP3++
ACC algorithm can be seen as a special teaser to show the algorithm performance in the condition of η t > β t . It performs better than AUFH-EXP3++
EMP , but it does not have the adversarial regime performance guarantee.
In our second experiments shown in Fig. 3 , we simulate moderately contaminated stochastic environment by drawing the first 2,500 rounds of the game according to one stochastic model and then switching the best channel and continuing the game until 8 * 10 6 rounds. This action can be regarded as an occasional jamming effect. In this case, the contamination is not fully adversarial, but drawn from a different stochastic model. We run this experiment with ∆ = 0.2, k r = 2 and n = 8, 16, 32. The results are presented in Figure 4 . Although it is hard to see the first 2,500 rounds on the graph, their effects on all the algorithms is clearly visible. Despite the initial corrupted rounds the AUFH-EXP3++ EMP algorithm successfully returns to the stochastic operation mode and achieves better results than Anti-Jam-EXP3 [11] .
To our knowledge, it is very hard to stimulate the fully adversarial regime with arbitrarily and randomly changing oblivious jamming behavior. In our third experiments shown in Fig. 4 , we simulate the oblivious jammer to emulate the adversary regime by switching the best channel at every other time slots given a randomly chosen channel with a pseudorandom sequence generator function, where the channel gains are set before running the algorithm. Moreover, we set k r = 2 and ∆ = 0.2 to further reduce the implementation complexity. It is not difficult to feel that the reward sequences still follow certain stochastic pattern, but not that obvious. We run all the algorithms up to 8 * 10 6 rounds. It can be find that our AUFH-EXP3++ EMP algorithm will be close to and have slightly better performance when compared to Anti-Jam-EXP3 [11] , which confirms with our theoretical analysis.
In our fourth experiments shown in Fig. 5 , we simulate the case of adaptive jamming attack in the adversarial regime with memory size m = 1, where the jammer choose the subset of channels to attack only based on the previous timeslot channel observation. Please note that the simulation requires very high computational complexity to re-configure all algorithms for each new channel setting due to the reshuffle of the best channels in advance. We can find that there are large performance degradations for all the algorithms when compared to the oblivious jammer case.
We also compared the computing time of the two versions of AUFH-EXP3++
EMP , Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, with different set of (n, k r ) pairs for each round. The results are listed in table I. From the results, we can see that Algorithm 2 scales linearly with the increase of the size of n and k r , and have very low computational cost than the Algorithm 1. Imagine in a practical typical multi-channel wireless communication system with (n, k r ) = (64, 12), the Algorithm 1 takes about 162 seconds to finish one round calculation that is infeasible, while the Algorithm 2 takes about .134 seconds to finish one round calculation that is very reasonable in practical implementation.
For brevity, we do not plot the regret performance figures for the mixed adversarial and stochastic regime. However, in our last experiments, we compare the received data packets rate (Mbps) for all the four different regimes after a sufficient long period of time t = 2 * 10 7 . Here we assume M = 1 packet contains 1000 bits and each timeslot is just one second. We set k r = 2 and ∆ = 0.2 as fixed values for all different size of channel set n. We plot our results in Fig. 6 . It is easy to find that our algorithm AUFH-EXP3++ EMP attains almost all the advantages of the stochastic MAB algorithms CombUCB1, and has better throughput performance than Anti-Jam-EXP3. Thus, it is superior and flexible to be implemented in general unknown environments.
VIII. RELATED WORKS
The use of MAB-based theory for solving the wireless communications and networking problems with priorly unknown channel statistics has gained extensive attention in recent years. These works can roughly be categorized into two type of MAB models: stochastic MAB and adversarial MAB. The works that assume the stochastic MAB model are used widely in many situations with stochastic channel assumptions, such as in dynamic spectrum access [15] [26] [27] , cognitive radio networks [14] , channel monitoring in infrastructure wireless networks [18] [24], wireless scheduling [17] , and channel access scheduling in multi-hop wireless networks [16] , etc. The non-stochastic (adversarial) MAB model is applied in adversarial channels (e.g., controlled by jammer) and irregular behaviors, such as, the anti-jamming wireless communications [10] - [12] , short-path routing [9] [30], non-stochastic channel access affected by primary user activity in cognitive radio networks [13] and power control and channel selection in infrastructureless wireless networks [19] , etc. However, almost all of them assume a known type of MAB model for the wireless environment, which is impractical in applications due to the fact that the environment can not be simply asserted as a choice between the two. In other words, we need to provide an adaptive algorithm to fit well into the two models.
The stochastic and adversarial MABs have co-existed in parallel for almost two decades, and the performance analysis approaches in these two realms are largely different. Only until recently, the attempt of [23] to bring them together did not make it in a full sense of unification, since the algorithm relies on the knowledge of time horizon and makes an one-time irreversible switch between stochastic and adversarial operation modes if the beginning of the play exhibits adversarial behavior. The first adaptive and practical algorithm for both stochastic and adversarial bandits are proposed in [22] . This algorithm is developed under the classic EXP3 algorithm by adjusting the control lever of exploration parameter to achieve the near optimal performance in both realms.
In our current work, we use the idea of introducing the novel exploration parameter ξ t (f ) into our own special combinatorial exponentially weight algorithm by exploiting the channel dependency among different strategies. Our proposed new framework avoids the computational inefficiency issue for general combinatorial adversary bandit problems as indicated in [16] [20] . It achieves a regret bound of order O(k r √ tn ln n), which only has a factor of O( √ k r ) factor off when compared to the optimal O( √ k r tn ln n) bound in the combinatorial adversary bandit setting [31] . However, we do believe that the regret bound in our framework is the optimal one for the EXP3 type of algorithm settings in the sense that the algorithm is computational efficient. Thus, our work is also a first computational efficient combinatorial MAB algorithm for general unknown environment 3 . What is more surprising and encouraging, in the stochastic regimes (including the contaminated stochastic regime), our algorithms achieve a regret bound of orderÕ( nkr log (t) ∆
). In the sense of channel numbers n and size of channels within each strategy k r , this is the best result to date for combinatorial stochastic bandit problems [28] . Please note that in [15] , they has a regret bound of order O( n 4 log (t) ∆ ); in [33] , the regret bound is O( n 3 log (t) ∆ ); and in [34] , the regret bound is O( ). Thus, our proposed algorithms are order optimal with respect to n and k r for all different regimes, which indicates the good scalability for general wireless communication systems or networks.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we propose a first adaptive multichannelaccess algorithm for wireless communications without the need of knowing the nature of environments. We design a computational efficient algorithm under a special combinatorial semi-bandit MAB framework. We divide the feature of the general wireless environments into four regimes, and provided solid theoretical analysis for each of them. We find that the almost optimal performance is achievable for all regimes. We have conducted extensive simulations to verify the performance of our algorithm in different regimes and have seen much better performance improvements over classic approaches. This indicates the generality and scalability of our algorithm for practical implementations. In the future, we are planning to extend our idea to general distributed, multi-hop wireless networks and other combinatorial MAB problems in other type of networks. Obviously, these problem are more interesting for networking researchers, but it might not be easy to obtain computational efficient algorithms as indicated in [31] .
